States Parties to the TPNW Must Adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol
NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE
APLN Member John Carlson discusses discrepancies in the application of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). You can read the paper on the NTI website here.
A new paper by NTI counselor John Carlson, The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Safeguards Standard, calls on states that have signed on to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to adopt stringent measures to ensure that nuclear facilities are not misused and materials are not diverted for military or other non-peaceful use.
Carlson notes that the TPNW lacks universal and rigorous verification standards, failing to require all parties joining the treaty to adhere to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which provides the legal basis for IAEA implementation of additional verification measures under safeguards. By failing to require non-nuclear-weapon states without an Additional Protocol to conclude one, the TPNW provides for two safeguards standards which is damaging to the global Nonproliferation regime.
In the paper, Carlson argues that all states parties to the TPNW must adopt the Additional Protocol to avoid a differentiated standard applied to signatories and to remain in line with IAEA standards and commitments made under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
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