Cyber-Nuclear Nexus And Escalation Pathways
Fei Su examines the growing risks at the intersection of the cyber and nuclear domains, highlighting how cyber incidents can threaten nuclear stability even when they do not directly target nuclear weapons systems. As nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) and early warning capabilities become increasingly reliant on digital technologies, incidents affecting supporting infrastructure could have unintended consequences for nuclear security. The difficulty of detecting and attributing cyber operations, combined with the possibility of mistaking technical malfunctions or human error for deliberate attacks, could lead to misperception and unintended escalation, particularly during a crisis. Focusing on China and the United States, this brief examines how cyber threats are addressed in nuclear doctrines and explores potential escalation pathways through selected cases of cyber incidents. It concludes by identifying measures governments can take to reduce the risks of miscalculation and escalation arising from cyber incidents in the nuclear domain.
About the Author
Fei Su is a Senior Researcher at the China and Asia Security Programme of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. She joined SIPRI as a Research Assistant in March 2015 and was based in Beijing. Prior to joining SIPRI, she lived and studied in Seoul for three years, where she strengthened her fluency in Korean. She holds a MA in Public Administration from Graduate School of Public Administration at Seoul National University, focusing on governance. She wrote her Korean-language dissertation on the impact of government size on corruption in China.
Fei’s current research interests focus on regional security issues in East Asia with a special interest in North Korea, China’s foreign and security policy, maritime security, cybersecurity and AI-nuclear nexus. She is currently a member of the Transatlantic Cyber Forum (TCF) working group on “Irresponsible Behavior During Cyber Operations” at Interface and has been admitted to the 2025-2026 cohort of the Arms Control Negotiation Academy (ACONA) Fellowship.
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