On April 1, ROK Foreign Minister Cho Hyun addressed the South Korean nuclear armament debate in an exclusive commentary for the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network. APLN invited experts to provide their comments on the Minister’s argument that non-proliferation is a strategic imperative for South Korea.

Read Minister Cho’s commentary here.

This page is being updated with additional responses from experts and APLN’s Members.

Jun Bonggeun

APLN Senior Research Adviser, Professor Emeritus at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy

The history of nuclear proliferation shows that a country confronting a nuclear-armed archenemy is highly likely to pursue nuclear armament of its own. As a divided nation, the two Koreas remain trapped in a zero-sum unification competition, each seeking to take over the other. Therefore, it is not surprising that outside observers often predict that South Korea will be the next country to go nuclear. High levels of support for nuclear armament in polls have been cited in support of this view.

I contend, however, that South Korea will be the last country to go nuclear. South Korea’s rise as a leading middle power—with a prosperous, advanced economy, strong diplomatic stature, open and free society, and global cultural influence—has been possible because it chose to sustain its alliance with the United States, preserve a free-trading economy, and remain a responsible, norm-abiding member of the international community. Should Korea choose nuclear armament, it would jeopardize these very foundations of its success. As Foreign Minister Cho warned, South Korea will become another North Korea. Indeed, when asked whether they support nuclear armament if it meant economic sanctions, the breakdown of the U.S. alliance, and international isolation, support falls to below half.

Maria Rost Rublee

Professor of International Relations at the University of Melbourne

The Foreign Minister’s statement makes a compelling case that firm commitment to nuclear nonproliferation is not a moral indulgence, but a realistic strategic choice. Calls to “go nuclear” often assume weapons can be acquired without consequence. In reality, as the Foreign Minister persuasively outlines, proliferation carries extensive diplomatic, security, and economic costs: weakened alliances, intensified regional instability, disrupted supply chains, sanctions risk, and the erosion of international trust on which advanced economies depend. Nuclear weapons do not substitute for alliances, market access, or political legitimacy, and in fact they frequently undermine all three.

For countries such as South Korea and Australia, whose security and prosperity are deeply embedded in the international system, nonproliferation strengthens rather than constrains national power. Both states have credible nuclear industries, advanced technological capabilities, and long records of compliance with the NPT. Working together, Australia and South Korea can champion responsible nuclear technology, reinforce global safeguards, and demonstrate that nuclear excellence and strategic restraint are mutually reinforcing.

Toby Dalton

Co‑Director, Nuclear Policy Program and Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

In recent years, vocal South Korean support for nuclear armament has moved from the fringe into mainstream discourse. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun’s commentary for APLN provides a clearly articulated alternative view based on the dangers of nuclearization and a different vision for South Korean security. The Lee Jae-Myung administration should make this the first step in a campaign to durably transform Korean public opinion on the nuclear question.

Though FM Cho’s characterization of non-proliferation as a “strategic imperative” argues persuasively against nuclearization, it does not explain how the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and fuel cycle capabilities can be managed in ways that avoid compounding risks to ROK security. These technologies would take South Korea right to the threshold of nuclear weapons capability, even if that is not the Lee administration’s intention. Here there is more work for FM Cho and his colleagues to do. For these sensitive capabilities, South Korea should identify concrete steps – declaratory statements, additional transparency measures, or built-in commercial incentives, for instance – that could reassure South Korea’s allies and adversaries alike that these capabilities are not merely a nuclear weapons option in disguise and will not destabilize regional security or the global nonproliferation regime as a result.

The opinions articulated above represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network or any of its members. APLN’s website is a source of authoritative research and analysis and serves as a platform for debate and discussion among our senior network members, experts, and practitioners, as well as the next generation of policymakers, analysts, and advocates.

Comments and responses can be emailed to apln@apln.network.

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