| Dear Friends and Colleagues,
This month, two major developments reshaped the global nuclear landscape. The 11th NPT Review Conference concluded without a consensus outcome, signalling the fragility of multilateral arms control and the nonproliferation regime, while the Trump-Xi summit marked a high-stakes return to leader-level diplomacy to stabilise US-China relations.
In response to these pivotal developments, we issued a joint statement calling on Washington and Beijing to prioritise Korean Peninsula security and pivot toward a framework of “stable co-existence.” This pragmatic approach was further detailed in an accompanying policy brief by Frank O’Donnell outlining concrete steps for renewed diplomacy.
Examining the gridlock in the NPT process, Marianne Hanson argued that the treaty’s review cycles face unprecedented challenges, warning that a lack of progress on disarmament and accountability could permanently fracture the global nuclear order. Complementing this analysis, a commentary by Manpreet Sethi and Hree Samudra traces how the collapse of the RevCon outcome reflects a deeper, structural imbalance within the nuclear order, arguing that middle powers must now step up to rectify these defects. We also co-organised a private side-event at the 2026 NPT Review Conference on nuclear safety and security measures to reduce the risks of inadvertent or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.
As part of our ongoing analysis on great-power competition in the Asia-Pacific, we released a special report by Kelly Grieco, challenging the assumption that Asian minilaterals will seamlessly align into balancing coalitions against China. Hoo Chiew Ping and Ngeow Chow Bing evaluate the five most consequential defence partnerships set to shape Malaysia’s strategic environment amid shifting major-power dynamics. Additionally, Prashanth Parameswaran draws on extensive field research to assess how the increase in military exercises is reshaping strategic norms across Asia.
Our latest publications also provide critical assessments of China’s technological military trajectory and emerging maritime flashpoints in South Asia. Jingdong Yuan assesses the PLA’s pivot toward artificial intelligence and ‘intelligentisation,’ while Tianjiao Jiang analyses Beijing’s recent arms control white paper, offering concrete frameworks for US-China cooperation to avert an AI-induced crisis. Turning to regional maritime stability, Sudarshan Shrikhande examines how the China-Pakistan strategic partnership and evolving maritime nuclear capabilities are compounding risks at sea, highlighting the urgent need for regional confidence-building measures and political restraint.
Thank you for your continued support of APLN, and as always, I welcome your feedback on our work. |
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| Kind regards,
Shatabhisha Shetty
APLN Executive Director |
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Breaking the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Stalemate: Recommendations for the United States, South Korea, and China
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A group of leading American and South Korean experts issued a joint statement coordinated by APLN, calling on leaders of the United States and China to place Korean Peninsula security on their bilateral agenda ahead of the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing. Drawing on a workshop co-hosted by APLN, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Institute for National Security Strategy, the statement urges a shift toward “stable co-existence” as the basis for renewed negotiations with Pyongyang, moving beyond previous denuclearisation-focused frameworks that have produced diplomatic deadlock since the collapse of the Hanoi Summit in 2019. Key recommendations include establishing a high-level US-ROK task-force, appointing a US Special Envoy for the DPRK, and decoupling cooperation on the peninsula from the broader US-China relationship.
Notably, the workshop’s central recommendation was reflected in the summit’s outcome: the White House confirmed that both leaders reaffirmed their shared goal of denuclearising North Korea, while China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that nuclear issues on the peninsula were discussed, urging dialogue and negotiation for a peaceful settlement.
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Breaking the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Stalemate: Recommendations for the United States, South Korea, and China
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Frank O’Donnell builds on the statement’s recommendations in a policy brief that takes a deeper look at the rapidly evolving North Korean nuclear threat and charts a path toward renewed diplomacy. He argues that “stable co-existence” offers a more realistic foundation for engagement and lays out detailed recommendations for the United States, the Republic of Korea, and China. His proposals include appointing a US Special Envoy, establishing a US Liaison Office in Pyongyang, pursuing an end-of-war declaration, and clarifying ROK civil nuclear safeguards.
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The 2026 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Faces More Challenges Than Ever Before
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| Marianne Hanson examines the mounting pressures that confronted the NPT during the 2026 Review Conference, arguing that the treaty faces a qualitatively new and more dangerous set of challenges than at any previous point in its history. She identifies several major trends shaping the current NPT review cycle and warns that without meaningful progress on disarmament, accountability, and nuclear risk reduction, the 2026 NPT RevCon risks deepening divisions within the global nuclear order. |
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The NPT’s Ownership Crisis: What the RevCon Battles Reveal
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Manpreet Sethi and Hree P. Samudra argue that the collapse of the NPT RevCon outcome reflected not simply disagreement over Iran, but deeper structural fractures within the nonproliferation regime that have worsened over time. Tracing how language on nuclear non-use, risk reduction, and disarmament commitments evolved or disappeared across successive draft texts, they warn that the NPT’s foundational bargain is becoming dangerously unbalanced amid arms control erosion and accelerating nuclear modernisation. They contend that if the depositary states fail to uphold the treaty’s core principles, middle-power and non-nuclear-weapon states must play a greater role in preserving the regime.
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Beyond Collective Balancing: A Typology of Asian Minilaterals and US Strategic Expectations
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Drawing on an analysis of 32 Asian minilateral groupings, Kelly Grieco observes that US expectations for Asian minilaterals are increasingly disconnected from regional realities. Rather than coalescing into peer-based balancing coalitions against China, most minilateral arrangements in the region are shaped by geography, power asymmetries, and differing threat perceptions. The report concludes that the United States should work with the region’s diverse security arrangements as they exist, rather than pressure states into coalitions they are unlikely to sustain.
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Situating Malaysia’s Defence Partnerships: Prospects for the Next Decade
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Hoo Chiew Ping and Ngeow Chow Bing analyse how Malaysia views the US–China power balance over the next decade and the resulting security risks to its strategic environment. They evaluate Malaysia’s major defence partnerships, identifying the five most critical based on strategic, operational, and political impact. The authors argue that to maintain its delicate equilibrium, Malaysia must leverage these relationships through a careful, measured approach that balances international collaboration with domestic defence priorities and capabilities.
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Military Exercises and Security Multialignment in Asia amid US-China Competition
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Prashanth Parameswaran assesses the accelerating proliferation of military exercises in Asia, driven by intensifying US–China strategic competition. As Washington solidifies its alliances and Beijing makes new regional inroads, local middle powers are navigating alignment pressures while increasingly engaging with a more diversified group of partners. Drawing on extensive field research and interviews with regional policymakers and exercise planners, Parameswaran offers a critical assessment of how this shifting exercise landscape is reshaping strategic norms and the balance of power.
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China and AI-Military Integration: Perspectives, Opportunities, and Challenges
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Jingdong Yuan provides an assessment of China’s strategic pivot toward military intelligentisation, exploring how Beijing is integrating AI into the PLA to gain a decisive edge in its rivalry with the United States. Driven by mandates from the 20th National Congress of the CPC, the Chinese military is transitioning from information-guided and network-centric warfare to AI and automation-driven modernisation. Examining how Chinese analysts view these disruptive technologies as a historic opportunity to “overtake on a curve,” the paper explores the operational benefits, inherent risks of AI-nuclear integration, and the steep implementation challenges facing the PLA.
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Chinese Perspectives on Arms Control and Strategic Stability in Emerging Technologies
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Tianjiao Jiang analyses Beijing’s recent white paper, “China’s Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation in the New Era,” arguing that it signals a shift toward a more proactive Chinese stance on global security governance. As “cross-domain entanglement” in space, cyber, and AI increasingly blurs the boundaries of modern warfare, Jiang offers concrete recommendations for US-China cooperation to establish the multi-layered safeguards necessary to prevent an AI-induced strategic crisis.
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Naval Competition in South Asia and the Limits of Confidence Building Measures
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Sudarshan Shrikhande examines how naval competition in South Asia is shaped by India’s strategic rivalries with both Pakistan and China, compounded by a China-Pakistan partnership he argues is more coherent than some formal US alliances. He warns that emerging technologies and the growing role of sea-based nuclear capabilities risk further complicating an already volatile maritime environment. While confidence-building measures have existed between India and Pakistan for decades, Shrikhande contends they are not foolproof; regional stability ultimately depends on political restraint, clear rules of engagement, and reliable military communication during crises.
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APLN at the 2026 NPT Review Conference
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APLN co-organised a side-event at the 2026 NPT Review Conference on nuclear fail-safe on 7 May, in partnership with the European Leadership Network (ELN) and supported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Hosted by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, the event brought together officials and experts to discuss nuclear safety, security, and measures to reduce the risk of unauthorised or inadvertent nuclear weapon use. Participants explored how emerging technologies may affect nuclear risks, considered unilateral and joint risk-reduction measures that the P5 could pursue, and discussed how the perspectives of non-nuclear-weapon states could be reflected in the NPT Review Conference outcome document.
APLN members Kim Won-soo, Nobumasa Akiyama, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Senior Research Adviser Frank O’Donnell, Senior Policy Fellow Joel Petersson-Ivre and Policy Fellow Fang Liu participated in the workshop.
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