Navigating Quantum Technologies for Undersea Nuclear Risk Reduction: Principles and Perceptions
Ariel (Phantitra) Phuphaphantakarn examines how emerging quantum technologies could affect submarine detection, navigation and strategic decision-making, and how perceptions of these capabilities could influence nuclear deterrence and escalation risks.
The paper finds that major powers in the Asia-Pacific, including Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States, are investing heavily in quantum technologies. While many military applications remain under development, advances in quantum sensing could eventually improve submarine detection and challenge the survivability of SSBNs, which play a critical role in maintaining credible second-strike capabilities.
However, the paper argues that the strategic implications of quantum technologies extend beyond their actual technical capabilities. Uncertainty about an adversary’s technological progress, combined with fears of losing strategic advantages, could intensify arms competition, undermine confidence in nuclear deterrence and create pressure for rapid decision-making during crises.
To address these challenges, the paper proposes the SIREN framework – Strategy, Investigation, Reassurance, Evaluation and Navigation – a five-stage approach designed to promote international cooperation, transparency and responsible quantum technology development while reducing the risks of nuclear escalation.
Key findings
Quantum technologies are becoming an increasingly important element of strategic competition in the Asia-Pacific. Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States are making substantial investments in quantum computing, communication and sensing, reflecting their growing importance to national security, technological competitiveness and future military capabilities.
Advances in quantum sensing could challenge submarine stealth and nuclear deterrence. Technologies such as quantum magnetometers, gravity gradiometers and quantum imaging could improve underwater detection and tracking capabilities. If these technologies eventually compromise the survivability of SSBNs, they could undermine confidence in second-strike capabilities and destabilise existing nuclear deterrence relationships.
The strategic risks of quantum technologies may emerge before their full operational deployment. Even where quantum military applications remain technologically immature, perceptions that an adversary possesses superior detection capabilities could influence strategic calculations, intensify security dilemmas and encourage greater investment in anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
“Quantum anxiety” could increase the risk of miscalculation and nuclear escalation. Fear of losing technological advantages or having strategic submarines exposed could create pressure for states to act quickly during crises. Such perceptions could compress decision-making time and increase the possibility of escalation at both conventional and nuclear levels.
Quantum technologies could also enhance submarine navigation and operational capabilities. Quantum inertial navigation systems could reduce dependence on vulnerable satellite navigation systems, while advanced quantum sensors could improve underwater situational awareness. However, technical limitations, high costs and deployment challenges mean that many of these applications require further development and testing.
International communication and transparency are essential to preventing misperceptions. Given the dual-use nature of quantum technologies, states may interpret even civilian or defensive research as evidence of military competition. Clear communication about technological intentions, applications and limitations could help reduce uncertainty and prevent unnecessary escalation.
The paper proposes the SIREN framework to guide quantum-related nuclear risk reduction. The framework calls for states to develop shared strategies for nuclear risk reduction, investigate potential applications of quantum technologies, reassure others about their intentions, regularly evaluate technological developments and establish long-term governance principles to prevent quantum-driven nuclear escalation.
About the Author
Ariel (Phantitra) Phuphaphantakarn is a Policy Fellow at the APLN. Ariel’s research focuses on the intersection of emerging technologies with nuclear risk, perception, and decision-making. Her work examines how trust, strategic behavior, and international cooperation are shaped in technologically mediated environments. Her areas of expertise include technology and conflict; nuclear threat perception; bargaining and decision theory; and human-machine relation.
The paper is part of APLN’s series on undersea warfare and nuclear risk in the Asia-Pacific, supported by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung. All views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the official views of HBS, the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, or its board, members, or other funders.
Image: iStock/Bartlomiej Wroblewski
